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VIOLENCE AND OBSCENITY-CHAPLINSKY REVISITED
I. INTRODUCTION
Violent political protest and explicit sexual displays and materials are two
seemingly disparate forms of communication which legislatures historically have
sought to control through the police powers of the state.' While the courts for
some time have distinguished protected expression from socially harmful con-
duct,2 the judicial mechanisms advanced to control forms of speech which create
a reaction resulting in breach of the public safety have been interlocked with
those devised against directly violent conduct and against long-range deleterious
effects upon public morals. 8 The treatment of the police powers over health,
safety, welfare and morals as a single interest rather than four separate interests
has contributed to this long-standing intermingling of powers.4
In recent Supreme Court decisions, the newly announced tests for socially
offensive obscenity and for socially harmful protest appear to reflect the con-
vergence of these two aspects of regulation of expression embodied in the concept
of "fighting" words--speech so harmful as to cause another person to break the
1. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2635 (1973). "Freedom of speech or
press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights
other than those of the advocates are involved." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642
(1951). Regarding the state interests against the obscene, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 93
S. Ct. 2607, 2621 (1973) ; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968) ; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-41 (1968) ;
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959);
Roth v. United States, 354 US. 476, 482-85 (1957). In regard to political speech, see, eg,
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1971); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-64
(1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Chaplins y v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See also T. Emerson,
The System of Freedom of Expression 285-388 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Emerson];
M. Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review 59-62 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Shapiro]; Bickel, 22 The Public Interest 25, 25-26 (Winter 1971).
2. "[T]he essence of a system of freedom of expression lies in the distinction between
expression and action." Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
Yale L.J. 877, 955 (1963); see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 559, 564-66 (1965); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78-79 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United
States 149-50 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Chafee].
3. See Mfller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2613 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109, 117-18 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
4. The police power over morals is mentioned in many early cases invoking the police
power over commercial affairs. See, e.g., Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1912);
Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) ; Barbler v. Connolly, 113 US. 27,
31-32 (1885). The police power once was said to encompass every enactment concerning the
people, in whole or in part, in their rights as citizens, or in their private relations. New York
v. Mn, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 138 (1837).
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law in response.5 The origins of this first intersection between obscenity and
protest, and the continuing impact of that commingling today,0 are the subject
of this Comment's inquiry. Even in a society which regards freedom of speech as
one of its most cherished possessions, 7 the interest in complete freedom of expres-
sion must be reconciled with other fundamental rights of the citizenry, through
the process of comparison which has come to be called "balancing." S High among
these other interests is the necessity for a peaceful environment in which the
person who wishes to speak his mind will not shun the free trade of ideas in
public for lack of safety. Accordingly, this interest in public peace is ideally a sig-
nificant part of the protection of free expression.1 0 However, an exaggerated con-
ception of social disorder can result in severe infringement upon the rights of
5. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942); State v. Chaplinsky, 91
N.H. 310, 320, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (1941). "The direct tendency of such conduct, like that of
libel ... is to provoke the person against whom it is directed, to acts of violence." State v.
Brown, 68 N.H. 200, 201, 38 A. 731, 732 (1895); see Shapiro, supra note 1, at 78, 118; 2 Bill
of Rights Rev., 224, 226 (1942). The concept of "fighting" words owes much to the writings
of Professor Chafee. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 2, at 149-52.
6. See notes 51, 65 infra.
7. "[Fjreedom of thought, and speech ...is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom," wrote Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). For a significant period, the first amendment occupied an announced
privileged position in the eyes of the Supreme Court. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
529-30 (1945); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting), rev'd
per curiam, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); P. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States 74-87
(1961); cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
8. In regard to the balancing of free expression against other rights and interests, see
generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
591-93 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66 (1961); American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950). The approach has been criticized as "ad hoc"
by its critics, but balancing has received widespread support. Compare P. Freund, supra
note 7, at 44; Mendelson, The First Amendment and the judicial Process: A Reply to Mr.
Frantz, 17 Vand. L. Rev. 479, 481-82 (1964), with Emerson, Towards a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963). See also Frantz, The First Amendment
in the Balance, 71 Yale L.J. 1424 (1962).
9. "But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... " Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ; see text accompanying note 27 infra. The
pragmatic and flexible conception of first amendment philosophy is shared by Martin Shapiro,
who urges that no one political belief will provide a firm base for the right of free speech
Cf. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 46-48.
10. For the proposition that the first amendment must operate in an environment of
safety see Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) ; Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) ; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
Yale L.J. 877, 931-35 (1963); McKay, Protest and Dissent: Action and Reaction, 1966 Utah
L. Rev. 20, 27 (1966); Meiklejobn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 S. Ct. Rev.
245, 259-60.
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speech and assembly," just as an exaggerated conception of the dangers of
obscenity can result in constriction of the freedoms of the press and of expres-
sion.' 2 Recently, the Supreme Court has held that there are legitimate state
interests which are threatened by "commercialized" obscenity,13 interests which
go beyond the protection of the public against what is felt to be unwarranted
offensiveness.' 4 Mr. Justice Burger has stated in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton:' 5
Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and
obscene material, the legislature . . . could quite reasonably determine that such a
connection does or might exist.
By its decisions in Miller v. California6 and its companion cases, 17 the Supreme
Court has held, in effect, that the states need not await the end of the dispute be-
tween behavioral experts and educators, but may proceed to control commerce in
obscene materials without being deterred by the full guarantees of the first amend-
ment.'
8
That there exists a connection between sexually explicit expression and behav-
ior which the state has a duty to punish and prevent is an assumption which un-
11. Emerson maintains that even a good faith protective cancelling of a speech or a march
would be an impermissible infringement upon speech and assembly. Emerson at 338-39. See
also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 55; Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest
and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1138-41 (1972).
12. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. at 2661 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-68 (1969) ; see A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General [hereinafter referred to as Memoirs v. M[assa-
chusetts], 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y.,
360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-500 (1957) (Harlan, J,
concurring and dissenting); see Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 S. Ct.
Rev. 1, 15-16 (1960); Melkejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 S. CL Rev.
245, 262.
13. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. CL 2628, 2635 (1973) ; see cases cited notes 16,
17 infra.
14. Mr. Chief Justice Burger has indicated that state interests in the regulation of ob-
scenity go beyond the protection of juveniles and non-consenting adults. 93 S. CL at 2635;
see Bickel, 22 The Public Interest 25, 25-26 (Winter 1971) for the development of the
privacy invasion.
15. 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2637 (1973); cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US. 568, 571-72 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931). But see Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 57-60
(1970); cf. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
391, 393 (1963).
16. 93 S. CL 2607 (1973).
17. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973) ; United States v. 12 200-FL
Reels of Super 8rm Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973); United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674
(1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S. CL 2680 (1973).
18. Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1973) ; see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
93 S. Ct. 2628, 2636-39 (1973).
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derlies obscenity law.' 9 As in the case of political dissent, such concepts of indirect
harm resulting from expression have been criticized as inadequate to override the
specific guarantees of the first amendment, 20 yet these presumptions have re-
mained, essentially because "a causal link has not been disproved either."'21 While
there is little doubt that the disagreement continues, among those who enact and
interpret the laws the assumption of antisocial effects generally prevails. How-
ever, cognizant of the problems inherent in attempting to prove a negative, the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography has reported that, in regard to adults:
Extensive empirical investigation, both by the Commission and by others, provides no
evidence that exposure to or use of explicit sexual materials play a significant role in
the causation of social or individual harms such as crime, delinquency, sexual or non-
sexual deviancy, or severe emotional disturbances. 22
The subject of antisocial effects of obscenity is further complicated by the
fact that two distinct concerns have been represented and mixed-the concern for
public safety and the concern for public morals. While open advocacy of moral
standards today is uncommon in such decisions, potential distinctions between
these interests rarely have been pursued.2 8 Similarly, in the area of political ex-
pression, the concern for public safety and the concern for public patriotism often
have been interlocked-a commingling of interests best illustrated by the treat-
ment of flag mutilation as protest.24 If the origins and the extent of the public
19. See obscenity cases cited note 1 supra. The implicit assumption that obscenity causes
harm appears in early cases involving obscenity in the mails. See notes 52-54 nfra. The con-
cept of "mischievous" results stems from the words of Lord Mellor in Regina v. Hlicklin,
[18681 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 378.
20. Cf. note 12 supra. See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963).
21. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642 (1968); Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censor-
ship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 Minn. L.
Rev. 1009, 1035-36 (1962); Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 S. Ct. Rev.
7, 52 (1966).
22. Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 58 (1970). The further
conclusions of the majority report included (a) the erotic is a source of information and
entertainment, (b) public opinion does not support its suppression, (c) the suppression threat-
ens communication and speech, (d) the commerce in sexual materials is quite small when
compared to the entire publishing and entertainment business. Id. at 59-62.
23. Emerson maintains that a moral stance on obscenity is no longer justified. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 937-39 (1963). Henkln
argues that obscenity law is solely moral, and, in that morality stems from religion, the exIS-
tence of obscenity laws in this country constitutes an establishment of religion. Henkin,
Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391, 407-14 (1963).
One of the few Supreme Court decisions to hint at a distinction between moral and safety
considerations was Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684,
688 (1959). See text accompanying note 80 infra.
24. The use of the term "desecration" in flag mutilation statutes seems to imply a con-
cern for national allegiance to state symbols as much as a concern for national goals. Cf.
People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970), aff'd by an
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safety concerns in the regulation of expression could be ascertained, perhaps the
areas where other concerns stand on the borrowed cogency of safety could be
identified, and those concerns compelled to stand or fall on their own merits.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF MECHANISMS TO REGULATE SPEECH
A. The "Clear and Present Danger" of Dissent
It is always in times of crisis that the extent of power and the definition of
rights require clearest delineation. In the first years of this century, when the
Supreme Court dealt with labor unionses and with radical dissent against the na-
tional government,2 6 Mr. Justice Holmes advanced perhaps the first comprehen-
sive judicial statement dealing with the purposes of the first amendment. Holmes'
"marketplace of ideas" thesis embodied the developing idea that free speech ulti-
mately is directed towards the attainment of truth:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... [Tihe best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market .... 27
This pragmatic perspective on the first amendment, stated in mercantile terms,
appeared in an age when expression and civil disobedience intersected in the
economic demands of labor unions. In 1911, in a case dealing with publication of
charges of unfair labor practices in violation of an injunctione2 the Supreme
Court observed:
[Publication] gives the words "Unfair," 'Ve don't patronize," or similar expressions,
a force not inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible
right of speech which a single individual might have. Under such circumstances they
become what have been called "verbal acts" ....20
While the Court urged that the publication and distribution were harmful to
the property of boycotted businesses, 30 even in this early case, the different as-
pects of acts made illegal because of their expression and acts made illegal be-
cause of their violent potential are completely commingled. However, the Supreme
Court was about to make just that distinction in a case dealing with radical
speech against war efforts, Scnneck v. United States.81
The "clear and present danger" test of Mr. Justice Holmes first advanced a
equally divided Court, 401 U.S. 531 (1971) (per curiam). See also Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969); Chafee, supra note 2, at 150.
25. E.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); see notes 28-30
infra.
26. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919). See text accompanying notes 31-39 infra.
27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see note
9 supra.
28. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
29. Id. at 439.
30. Id.
31. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
19731
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
judicial process through which public safety could be reconciled with free expres-
sion. 2 While the words of the oft-quoted phrase appear to be a stringent test
comprised solely of proximity and degree, the explanation of the Court suggests
a test flexible in application-a test which depends as much upon the circum-
stances of the act as upon the content of the words used.83 Through this flexi-
bility, Justice Holmes strove to give the speech in question the benefit of the
doubt, in the hope that, as Professor Freund observed, "a bit of sense may be
salvaged from the odious by minds striving to be rational . . .,,"
Mr. Schenck, like those restrained in subsequent cases, had advocated disrup-
tion of governmental recruitment during the First World War, a time which, as
Justice Holmes observed, was one of heightened national sentiments.3 5 The later
cases purported to follow the key phrase of Holmes', but, failing to apply the con-
cept of flexibility, moved instead towards a balancing of state interests with
political dissent; the state interests most often prevailed.8 0 This open-ended pro-
gression of regulation prompted Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v. Calijornia,8 '
to advance a new distinction, one of advocacy versus actual incitement. While
noting that citizens in different eras had held different fears which later proved to
be *unfounded, Justice Brandeis proposed a standard which was not only far
from the actual position of the Court, but also one which was perhaps out of
keeping with the flexible nature of the "clear and present danger" analysis:
32. Id. Schenck was accused of attempting to disrupt the draft; however, his act of
pamphleteering was recognized as pure speech. The situation prompted Justice Holmes to
write perhaps the best known comment on the limits of the first amendment: "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire In a
theatre and causing a panic." 249 U.S. at 52.
33. "[Tihe character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which It Is done.
... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree." Id.
34. P. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States 43 (1967). The sentiment relates
to the concept of the first amendment as striving to attain truth. See note 9 supra. Contra,
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) ("utterly devoid of redeeming social
value"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("such slight social value
as a step to truth").
35. "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such
a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight . .. ."
249 U.S. at 52; see Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a
Nation Is at War, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 25-27 (1971).
36. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) and Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1919) with Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215-16 (1919);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239,
249 (1920) and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667-71 (1925). In regard to the dis-
integration of the Holmes test see Emerson 102-04. In Gitlow, supra, the Court wrote that
in regard to enactments pursuant to public safety, "relvery presumption is to be indulged In
favor of the validity of the statute." 268 U.S. at 668.
37. 274 U.S. 357, 376-78 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
[Vol. 42
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[E]ven advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for
denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing
to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference
between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assem-
bling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind.38
Regardless of whether Justice Brandeis' analysis proved effective, the vital
point is that he did attempt to distinguish between morality and safety. Similarly,
four years later, the Court made a successful distinction between public patriotism
and public safety in Stromberg v. California,9 where the Court first dealt with
what has come to be known as symbolic speech. 0 In that case the right of a
citizen was upheld in the act of expressing opposition to the present form of
government through the display of a communist flag,41 and full first amendment
protection was extended to symbolic communication, at least in the act of a flag
display. Explicit recognition of communication by salute came twelve years later
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.-
However, in the same term as Stromberg, the Court failed to distinguish be-
tween public morals and safety as it had between public patriotism and safety.
In Near v. Minnesota,43 the Court upheld the right of a newspaper to publish
scandalous allegations concerning city officials, but refused to strike down the
concept of prior restraint, observing that:
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number
and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may
be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be
38. 274 US. at 376. The case involved the restraint of an individual who belonged to,
but did not subscribe to the methods of, an organization advocating violent political change.
Mr. Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurred with the Court on narrow procedural grounds
but disagreed with the majority's view on free speech. Id. at 372-0. While Brandeis' dis-
tinction was not adopted by the Court, recently it has been approved in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969); see text accompanying notes 107-10 infra.
39. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
40. While the Court recognized the communicative aspect of the display, the idea is patent
in the statute itself. 283 U.S. at 369. For a review of the modern concept of communicative
or "symbolic" conduct see Emerson 79-86; Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct, 1968
S. Ct. Rev. 1; Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 63 (1968). The special attention afforded the subject is primarily the result of
the Court's treatment of draft-card burning in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
See also Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1091 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sym-
bolic Conduct]; text accompanying notes 124-33 infra.
41. The absence of the term "violent" opposition rendered the statute unconstitutionally
vague. 283 U.S. at 369-70; see Chafee 362-66; Symbolic Conduct 1093.
42. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). "There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the
flag salute is a form of utterance." Id. at 632. The Court's approval of full first amendment
protection in flag cases appears to be limited to displays and salutes. Cf. Cowgill v. Cali-
fornia, 396 U.S. 371 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593-94 (1969). On the
right of a citizen to employ symbols against the government see Emerson at 79-90.
43. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of
orderly government.
44
The words of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota demonstrate
two lines of development which were to converge in Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire45 First, by speaking of obscenity and violent obstruction to war efforts in
one breath, Chief Justice Hughes failed to distinguish between moral concerns
and safety concerns. Second, by his mingling of the incitement concept4" with
the obscene, he foreshadowed the Chaplinsky doctrine of "fighting" words.
The idea that expression could compel another to violence was treated first
in Cantwell v. Connecticut,4 7 where a record played in a street almost caused a
fight because of its attack on all religions. In a mixing of the Holmes analysis and
balancing, the Court observed that some expression could be restrained because
it was extremely probable that a violent reaction would result.48 Yet the result
of the decision reflected a successful distinction between public safety and moral
concerns for religion; the indirect breach of the peace theory was not applied.40
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, decided two years later, a person was ar-
rested for calling a city marshal a fascist during the period of the Second World
War. 0 The situation prompted the Supreme Court to announce a certain class
of speech outside the scope of first amendment protection:
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.51
44. Id. at 716 (footnote ommitted).
45. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
46. 283 U.S. at 716; see Chafee 149-50; Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhur-
ried Children's Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 S. Ct. Rev. 153, 177; Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 S. Ct. Rev. 245, 262; note 38 supra and text accom-
panying note 66 infra.
47. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Shapiro regards this decision as a perfect union of the "clear and
present danger" test and the later balancing approach. See Shapiro at 77.
48. The Court required that offensive acts could be restrained only if they were directed
towards clearly ascertainable recipients. 310 U.S. at 308-09. See also Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
49. 310 U.S. at 309-10.
50. 315 U.S. at 569. See text accompanying notes 61, 62 infra.
51. 315 U.S. at 572. The proposition has been repeated widely, and both endorsed and
criticized. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2613 (1973); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 613 n.3 (1971); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Times Film Corp. v.
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957);
Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1949) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 n.10 (1949). The concept has been labeled as an
inadequate and dangerous mechanism, Emerson at 324-26; as the first true balancing test,
Shapiro at 78; as the modem source of the pursuit of truth concept, Brennan, the Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19
(1965) ; and as an avoidance of the "clear and present danger" analysis by the creation of
non-speech, Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Obscenity
Litigation, 1968 S. Ct. Rev. 153, 177. See also Stewart, Public Speech and Public Order In
Britain and the United States, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 625, 634 (1960); Wade, Tort Liability for
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Thus, the devices for control of politically dangerous speech appear to have
intersected with controls over the obscene. To illustrate this commingling further,
the evolution of obscenity law should be investigated.
B. Early Assumptions in Control of Obscenity
The first cases in the United States which dealt with obscenity involved the
transmission of explicit sexual materials through the mails.52 Present in most
of the cases which followed were two assumptions which have roots both in the
Supreme Court decision of Dunlop v. United StatesG3 and the English common
law decision of Regina v. Hicklin.54 Both cases noted that not only was obscenity
morally degrading, but also that it could result in "mischief".55 While the former
concern diminished, at least openly, with time"0 the latter came to be equated
with the antisocial and with actual criminal behavior.57 The ease with which the
courts moved from considerations of public morals to those of public safety is
due to the unitary approach to the police powers of the state. Most early cases
dealing with controls over business recited the power of the state over morals,a
and as a result the various powers have been able to support each other, espe-
cially when the reasons for moral controls appeared dubious.
Rarely was substantiation demanded for the assumptions regarding obscenity,
and the operation of the maxims of degradation and mischievous results were
checked only in the interest of recognized literary or scientific worksP However,
not until after the appearance of the idea of "fighting" words did these assump-
tions become legal maxims; not until Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire did the
control of the obscene come to rest so heavily upon variants of the controls for
politically dangerous dissent.GO
III. THE STAND.RDs oF FIGHTING VORDS
In 1942, a Jehovah's Witness, Chaplinsky, had created a commotion by his
iconoclastic remarks about religion and politics. A city marshal sent to escort
Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 102-10 (1950); Note, Verbal Acts and
Ideas-The Common Sense of Free Speech, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 328 (1949). Only two com-
mentators evaluated the decision when it first was handed down. 2 Bill of Rights Rev. 218,
224-26 (1942); 22 B.U.L. Rev. 446-49 (1942).
52. See, e.g., Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 504-11 (1904); Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 500 (1897);
United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890); Ex parte Jackson, 96 US. 727, 736-37
(1877).
53. 165 U.S. 486 (1897).
54. [1868] L.R. 3 QJ3. 360.
55. 165 U.. at 500; [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 378. See note 19 supra.
56. See note 23 supra.
57. Cf. text accompanying note 44 supra.
58. For a discussion of the mixing of the police powers in early cases see note 4 supra.
59. See, e.g., United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934);
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1930) ; cf. Regina v. Hicklin, (1868] L.R.
3 Q.B. 360, 367.
60. See 315 U.S. at 571-72; text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
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him from the scene was met with the expletives: "You are a God damned racke-
teer" and "a damned Fascist." 61 After Chaplinsky proceeded to bestow similar
appellations upon all the city officials of Rochester, New Hampshire, the police
arrested him for his words.6 2
Since 1894, New Hampshire common law had recognized the doctrine of breach
of the peace through words which produce violence in others.0 3 In addition, Pro-
fessor Chafee soon was to expound upon a limited idea of indirect breach of
public safety.64 The Supreme Court, however, took these ideas of public safety,
and mixing them with a variation of the "clear and present danger" doctrine and
assumptions about obscenity, produced a legal maxim which is firmly entrenched
today.6 5 Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion for the Court in Chaplinsky stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is dearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.06
If the Holmes analysis had been applied to this case, the fact that Chaplinsky
had called a police officer by the name of the national enemy would have been
important, primarily because, as in Schenck v. United States, 7 the nation was
again at war. However, despite the fact that the words of the Court draw upon
the truth-seeking analysis of Holmes68 (and, in reference to "weighing" of inter-
ests, prophesy the balancing era),°° in regard to certain speech, the entire passage
takes a reverse absolutist stand-that some expression always is excluded from
the protection of the first amendment.70
61. 315 U.S. at 569.
62. Id. at 569-70.
63. State v. Brown, 68 N.H. 200, 201, 38 A. 731, 732 (1895). The concept is akin to libel.
See note 5 supra.
64. Chafee wrote that common law crimes constitute injuries which "are usually com-
mitted by acts, but the law also punishes a few classes of words like obscenity, profanity, and
gross libels upon individuals, because the very utterance of such words is considered to inflict
a present injury ... ." Chafee, supra note 2, at 149.
65. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 111-18 (1972); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682-90 (1968) ; note 51 supra.
66. 315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire had
advanced a conception of the reaction as defined by that of the average individual in State v.
Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 320, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (1941). The United States Supreme Court
noted that proposition with approval, 315 U.S. at 573.
67. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; see note 35 supra.
68. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see text
accompanying notes 9, 27 supra.
69. For a discussion of the balancing era in first amendment cases see commentators cited
note 8 supra.
70. Krislov maintains that Chaplinsky should be credited with the creation of "non-
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This solidification of an assumption regarding obscenity is perhaps complicated
by the possibility that the references to the "lewd and obscene" refer only to
invectives and not to lascivious descriptions or depictions.71 Thus, this unclear
and possibly misinterpreted analysis of obscene speech springs from the same
case that produced balancing of expression versus state interests.72
Through the inexact use of previous mechanisms for control of speech, Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire accordingly created the concept of "fighting" words.
Professor Chafee, when he first developed the idea of "indirect" breach, warned
that "[tjhis breach of the peace theory is peculiarly liable to abuse when ap-
plied against unpopular expressions and practices.""3 The evolution of the Chap-
liusky analysis appears to provide substantiation for that caveat.
IV. THE IMPACT OF "FIGHTI:NG" WoRDs IN THE SUPR=r COUnT
A. In the Regulation of Obscenity
Although the mention of the obscene in the Chaplinsky test was only dictum,
and perhaps completely incidental, the idea that obscenity was among the narrow
categories of words which were not only dangerous but also nearly worthless to
society fifteen years later crystallized into the standards of Roth v. United
States. 4 While the Court has observed that freedom of speech, along with free-
dom of assembly, allows and even protects unrest and political dissatisfaction,."
speech", which need not even be weighed to be regulated. See Krislov, From Ginzburg to
Ginsberg, supra note 51, at 177.
71. Emerson has suggested that the concept of pruriency advanced in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957), was refined by Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959), to exclude from the concept of obscenity that which
did not, of itself, tend to incite lustful thoughts, despite the possibility that the expression
might advocate indecent or immoral conduct. Emerson, supra note 1, at 475. It would appear
by parallel that indecent expletives devoid of prurient nature could not be considered
obscene. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
72. Shapiro regards the division of speech into valid and invalid segments as the begin-
ning of the balancing approach towards expression. In that his conception of Holmes' market-
place of ideas includes all ideas which might serve a pragmatic purpose, any exclusion of
communication is equivalent to a total weighing of opposites. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 47, 62,
78.
73. Chafee, supra note 2, at 151. See also Emerson, supra note 1, at 90; Symbolic Conduct,
supra note 40, at 1122-23.
74. 354 U.S. at 485; see also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
75. "Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); cf. United States v. Cruishank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-52 (1876).
See generally Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688
(1959); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Thorahill v. Alabama, 310 US. 88, 104 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 US. 357, 376
(1926) (Brandeis, J'., concurring). The very concept of discontent is inherent in the first
amendment's protection of assemly-"the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
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such ferment has always been conceived primarily as directed towards the free
exchange of valid and socially important ideas and ideals.10 For the sake of this
ideal, the Court accepted the challenge of possible disruption; yet the assumption
had long existed, and Chaplinsky emphatically announced, that obscenity was
outweighed by other public concerns. 77 It was this train of thought which, in
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General,78 resulted in the final test of the Roth era-whether "the material is
utterly without redeeming social value."7 9
While empirical studies of the effects of obscenity were still in their infancy,
the connection between sex and violence developed after Roth with the assistance
of the "fighting" words doctrine. However, although Chaplinsky had equated
public morality and public safety, in 1959 the Court made a distinction between
morality and order when it held that state censorship could not be justified merely
because a motion picture portrayed an adulterous relationship contrary to the
moral standards, religious precepts and legal code of the citizenry. 0 While this
approach implicitly rejected a direct connection between obscenity and crime,
that connection was again afforded the shelter of an assumption in Ginsberg v.
New York,8 1 where the Court first dealt with the lack of empirical data support-
ing the now-familiar "antisocial" thesis. Through that decision the Court in-
corporated into obscenity law the roots of a further problem-that of variable
legal concepts of obscenity.82 Admitting that the concept of deleterious results
would be difficult to prove, the Court echoed Justice Holmes:
We have few scientifically certain criteria of legislation, and ... it often is difficult to
mark the line where what is called the police power of the States is limited by the
Constitution.8s
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. See also 1
Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774) (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1904).
76. See note 9 supra.
77. 315 U.S. at 571-72. The treatment of obscenity as something other than protected
speech occurred long before the assumption was ever explicitly stated. See text accompanying
notes 59-60 supra.
78. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) ; see note 12 supra.
79. 383 U.S. at 418; see Justice Brennan's analysis of this development in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2653-54 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
80. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
By embracing the strict standards of Justice Brandeis' test, note 38 supra, the Court im-
pliedly rejected a connection between obscenity and crime. Emerson has observed that this
treatment of "thematic" obscenity further defined the concept of pruriency. Emerson 475.
81. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
82. In People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 268, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1966),
dismissed as moot, 388 U.S. 439 (1967), the New York Court of Appeals upheld the power
of the legislature to employ different standards of obscenity depending upon the age of the
recipient. Accord, Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968). As of 1968, thirty-five
states had enacted obscenity laws pertaining to minors. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
647-48 (1968).
83. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911) quoted in part in Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968). For the background of the development of the variable
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By borrowing from a case concerning commercial matters decided under the
due process clause,84 the Supreme Court clearly demonstrated the borrowing of
standards from the police power over welfare and safety to buttress the police
power over morality. Further, the effect of the decision was that, when dealing
with obscenity, the legislatures would not be held to the precise standards of
regulation demanded of enactments concerning other forms of expression.8 5 Thus,
in matters dealing with the erotic, began an inevitable breakdown of the privi-
leges afforded all first amendment activities."0
The recent decision of the Court in California v. LaRue T demonstrates well
how matters of public safety have become interlocked with public morals. That
case dealt with three state interests--the control of alcohol under the twenty-first
amendment, the prohibition of explicit sexual display,8 8 and the regulation of ex-
pression which is not purely speech.89 While it is apparent that the decision of
standard see Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg, supra note 51, 1968 S. Ct. Rev. at 165-70;
Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
Minn. L. Rev. 5, 13-18 (1960).
84. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), involved police power regulation
over commerce, not over morals. Id. at 110. The police power is undoubted in areas of busi-
ness. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); H.P. Hood
& Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58-61
(1915).
85. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 US.
415, 438, 444 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958). See also cases cited note 7 supra.
86. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2620-21 (1973); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 93
S. Ct. 2222 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408
U.S. 229 (1972) (per curiam); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,
375-76 (1971). For a discussion of this progression see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93
S. Ct. 2628, 2653-54 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam) began the process of summary dis-
position which illustrates the extent of this disregard for possible rights involved in areas of
erotic expression and which Mr. Chief Justice Burger said was equivalent to unreviewable
censorship. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614 n.3 (1973). On the effect of summary
disposition as precedent see H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1581-82 (2d ed. 1973); Case Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Obscenity
Legislation: Roth and Stanley on a Seesaw, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 443, 450-55 (1972).
87. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
88. For the background of attempts by California to control toplessness through the
liquor power see, e.g., Boreta Enterprises, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2
Cal. 3d 85, 465 P.2d 1, 84 Cal Rptr. 113 (1970); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d
535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969), overruled in Crownover v.
Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 431, 509 P.2d 497, 514, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 698 (1973). The twenty-
first amendment provides in part, "The transportation or importation into any State, Terri-
tory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. Const. amend. X=I, § 2.
89. Mr. Justice Rehnquist treated the display as conduct regulable under the liquor power,
following Hostetter v. IdIewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964). 409 U.S. at 113-14.
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist did not rest solely upon any one of these three interests, 0
the effect of the holding was to allow the banning of topless entertainment and
filmed sex in any establishment licensed to sell liquor by the drink.91 Because of
the extraordinary power of the states over liquor, the Court was able to bypass
questions not only of morality, but even of legal obscenity, upon the borrowed
strength of the police power over public welfare.92
Finally, in the five recent decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the ob-
scene, the Chaplinsky maxim embodied in Roth was repeated to reaffirm the hold-
ing that obscenity is not protected speech.93 Hence, erotic expression holds no
initial guarantees of full protection since Mr. Chief Justice Burger has classed
all public displays of obscenity as activities subject to unquestioned regulation
like other economic activities.94 The term "commercialized obscenity"95 lies at
the center of this distinction, and as a result, the Court drew heavily upon com-
mercial regulation under the economic powers of the federal government and the
police powers of the states.96 Accordingly, the Court will refuse to investigate state
legislation in the area as long as it is valid upon its face.97
90. See the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, 409 U.S. at
120, 123, 123-39.
91. "While we agree that at least some of the performances ... are within the limits of
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the critical fact is that California has
not forbidden these performances across the board. It has merely proscribed such perfor-
mances in establishments that it licenses to sell liquor by the drink." 409 U.S. at 118. See
Crownover v. Musick, 9 CaL 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973).
92. 409 U.S. at 113-14.
93. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2636-37 (1973).
94. Id. at 2636-38. The Court has dealt with the intersection of protected speech and
commercial enterprises in many areas where profit did not preclude an initial guarantee of
full protection. See, e.g., Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (press) ; Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (film); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (film).
95. See 93 S. Ct. at 2638. In a recent decision on "commercial speech" the Court held that
an ordinance prohibiting newspapers from carrying sex-designated advertising columns did
not infringe upon first amendment rights. Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human
Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553, 2561 (1973). In regard to the development of commercial speech see,
e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Redish, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 (1971); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context,
78 Harv. L. Rev. 1191, 1197 (1965). The doctrine of Chaplinsky has contributed significantly
to the doctrine of commercial speech by the banning of television cigarette advertisements.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
96. See cases cited in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2637-39 (1973),
where the Court suggests an analogy between the regulation of commercialized obscenity and
the regulation of public announcements by dealers in securities ("blue sky" laws).
97. In regard to the question of legislative motive and intent compare Arizona v. Call-
fornia, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931) and McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904) with
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
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The employment of any and all of the police powers to deal with obscenity re-
mains firmly entrenched today.9" Based upon a casual observation of the Court in
Chaplinsky, the idea that obscenity is harmful and may be excluded from full pro-
tection has remained the central application of "fighting" words.90 Yet Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire was a decision regarding political speech, one which has differ-
ent roots than does obscenity. Today, in obscenity decisions, the "fighting" words
test is the starting point; that status today of Chaplinsky in political speech
should be examined so that this starting point may be evaluated.
B. "Fighting" Words in Political Protest
In Beauharnais v. llinois"'0 the Supreme Court applied the Chaplinsky doc-
trine to a case involving the defamation of blacks. Revealing the extent to which
the "fighting" words concept had abandoned the ethic of the Holmes test upon
which it was based, the Court wrote:
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it
is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the
phrase "dear and present danger."10 '
While the Chaplinsky doctrine, as applied to libel, was followed closely in this
case, the treatment of libel as a type of speech bereft of first amendment protec-
tion has been clearly discarded by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.'0 2 In that case a newspaper published an advertisement containing un-
true allegations regarding a police officer. Instead of regarding libel as absolutely
unprotected speech, the Court limited the awarding of libel judgments to cases
where public officials had been defamed falsely with actual malice or reckless
disregard for truth.'0 3 Clearly, this inquiry into the intent of the actor consti-
tuted a rejection of the application, per se, of "fighting" words.
The exact concept of "fighting" words-the core of the Chaplinsky doctrine-
has been rejected by three significant Supreme Court decisions. In Terminiello v.
Chicago' 4 a divided Court refused to restrain an abrasive speaker whose words
had contributed to the angry reaction of his audience. Mr. Justice Douglas, writ-
ing for the Court, noted that free speech which induces unrest and ferment "may
... best serve [the] high purpose" of the first amendment. 0 5 While this idea is
by no means universally held today, the case demonstrated the inherent danger in
233, 250-51 (1936). See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CL Rev. 95 (1971).
98. See note 51 supra and, generally, cases cited note 86 supra.
99. See notes 51, 65 supra.
100. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
101. Id. at 266.
102. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
103. Id. at 283-84. It has been observed that since Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952), equates press and entertainment in regard to the protection of
speech, the tests for obscenity should be treated equally. See Note, Dirty Words and Dirty
Politics: Cognitive Dissonance in the First Amendment, 34 U. ChL L. Rev. 367, 383 (1967).
104. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
105. Id. at 4; see note 75 supra.
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restraining a person from speaking merely because his neighbors could not refrain
from violence.' 00
More recently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,' 07 the Supreme Court, in a per curiam
decision, refused to designate the hostile words of a Ku Klux Klansman as un-
protected speech. The speaker had suggested retaliation against the federal gov-
ernment for its integration policies, but no actual preparation or commitment was
present. 1 Reaffirming the most stringent variant of the Holmes analysis, the
Court endorsed Justice Brandeis' distinction between advocacy and incitement, 00
and refused to employ the broad brush of "fighting" words.' 10
In 1971, the Court considered the value as speech of a four-letter word em-
ployed as protest against the Vietnam war. In Cohen v. California,"' the Court
recognized the legend "Fuck the Draft" as speech, refusing to control the conduct
under the aegis of "fighting" words. Although, like Schenck, 1 12 Cohen opposed
the draft in a time of war, and although, like Chaplinsky,"18 he used words consid-
ered improper, Mr. Justice Harlan cogently criticized the ethic of "fighting"
words in political context:
The argument amounts to little more than the self-defeating proposition that to avoid
physical censorship of one who has not sought to provoke such a response by a hypo-
thetical coterie of the violent and lawless, the States may more appropriately effectuate
that censorship themselves." 4
Thus, the central concept of "fighting" words-that indecent expletives have
no right to first amendment protection"r-has been rejected by the Supreme
Court, not only in Cohen, but also more recently in Papish v. University of Mis-
souri Board of Curators,11 where the Court upheld the right of a student to
print "'M --- f --- ' " in a school newspaper.
While the Court subsequently has pursued the protection of political speech
despite the presence of indelicate language,"17 there are indications that the view
106. Chafee has warned that the indirect breach of the peace doctrine has the danger of
making "a man a criminal simply because his neighbors have no self-control .... " Chafee,
supra note 2, at 151.
107. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
108. Id. at 447-49. For an analysis of this decision see Linde, "Clear and Present Danger"
Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1163 (1970).
109. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
110. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
111. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The Court rejected any idea of applying the Roth standards for
obscenity. Id. at 19-22.
112. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
113. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
114. 403 U.S. at 23. See also Chafee 149-52.
115. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
116. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
117. See Lewis v. New Orleans, 257 La. 993, 244 So. 2d 860 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 913
(1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 59 N.J. 435, 283 A.2d 535 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 901
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is developing among at least three of the Justices that an expansion of "fighting"
words should apply to speech addressed to many,118 and that the mechanisms ad-
vanced for the control of shocking political speech justifiably could reflect those
now recognized in the control of obscenity. In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,'" Mr.
Justice Powell, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun,"
protested the public utterance of the same expletive' 12 1 granted protection by the
Court in Papish:1
22
We have witnessed in recent years a disquieting deterioration in standards of taste
and civility in speech. For the increasing number of persons who derive satisfaction
from vocabularies dependent upon filth and obscenities, there are abundant oppor-
tunities to gratify their debased tastes. But our free society must be flexible enough
to tolerate even such a debasement provided it occurs without subjecting unwilling
audiences to the type of verbal nuisance committed in this case.1m
The concern for high standards of discourse and the protection of the non-con-
senting against that which is thought to be indecent emerges as a parallel to the
subsequent argument presented by Chief Justice Burger in the recent obscenity
decisions, and serves to indicate that those who have reaffirmed the philosophy
of "fighting" words in obscenity would prefer to see that concept, in a form now
expanded beyond its original scope, re-introduced to the regulation of political
speech.
Only in one area of political speech has the thinking of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire been revitalized, and in an extremely indirect way. In 1968, in United
States v. O'Brien,124 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a draft-card
burner in a decision which in no way invoked the "fighting" words doctrine,
despite the circumstances of the case. O'Brien and three companions burned their
draft cards before a sizable crowd on the steps of a Boston courthouse. 2 5 Draft-
(1972); Brown v. Oklahoma
, 
492 P.2d 1106 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1971), vacated, 408 U.S.
914 (1972).
118. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., &
Blackmun, J., dissenting from summary disposition vacating and remanding).
119. 59 N.J. 435, 283 A.2d 535, (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
120. 408 U.S. at 903 (Powell, J., dissenting). ir. Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissent,
also applied "fighting" words to the case and concluded that the appellants speech should
be restrained because of a tendency to incite a breach of the peace. Id. at 911, 912 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting, concurred in by Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J.).
121. As reported, "m ---f - was the term employed by appellant four times
while addressing a school board meeting of some 150 persons. Id. at 904 (Powell, J., dis-
senting).
122. See note 116 supra and accompanying text; while the term employed is apparently
identical to that in Papish, there the word was published and not spoken aloud to an
audience.
123. 408 U.S. at 909 (Powell, J., dissenting).
124. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
125. Id. at 369. Even before O'Brien's act, it was suggested that draft-card burning
was war-mongering propaganda, and that the federal government, to protect its foreign
policy, could silence such acts as speech tending to breach the international peace. Van Alstyne,
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card burning was then a recognized form of extreme dissent, one which already
had raised many tempers and perhaps prompted the 1965 amendment to the
Selective Service Act.1 26 Immediately after the burning, the dissenters were at-
tacked by members of the crowd; to the FBI agents who apprehended him,
O'Brien explained that his act was one of expression. 1
2 7
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, refused to accept O'Brien's
act as speech,12s and instead developed a four-pronged balancing test to be em-
ployed when an overreaching state interest collides with conduct which may be
communicative:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.129
Long before O'Brien, the "clear and present danger" test had fallen into dis-
repair, and was modified severely by the Court in Dennis v. United States.'
Chief Justice Warren's test replaced the various ad hoc balancing tests which the
Court had employed in the interim.' 3' Thus, O'Brien embodies, in a mechanism,
the final element of "fighting" words-the concept of balancing to ascertain what
expression is "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."'"2
In addition, it is possible that O'Brien, as well as the recent flag-mutilation
The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the United
States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 530, 542-45 (1966).
126. Cf. 391 U.S. at 376, 382-86. The fact that the crowd responded in anger and
violence would have been a prime consideration under the "clear and present danger"
analysis. See notes 31-32 supra.
127. 391 U.S. at 369, 376. "We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea." Id. at 376. Accordingly, the Court judged O'Brien's act primarily
upon his intent to communicate, failing to inquire whether his act was understood as com-
munication. For a treatment of the purposes of speech see Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 879-85 (1963). Even under the strict
definition of protected speech as limited to expression by which the people govern, see
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 S. Ct. Rev. 245, 255 (1961), it
would appear that O'Brien's act was an attempt at affecting foreign policy.
128. 391 U.S. at 376.
129. Id. at 377. In regard to the required state interest, Mr. Chief Justice Warren chose the
term "substantial" over a number of other terms employed during the balancing period:
"strong", Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963); "compelling", "substantial", NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 444 (1963) ; "subordinating", "cogent", Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ; "paramount", Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
130. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) and
notes 107-10 supra.
131. See note 8 supra.
132. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see text accompanying
note 66 supra.
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cases,'3 suffer from the confusion of public safety with public patriotism, a con-
fusion well established by Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
V. CONCLUSION
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, a decision almost totally ignored in its own
day, thus emerges as a focal point of four of the most important doctrines which
have been employed by the Supreme Court in its continuing attempt to find a
workable definition of free expression in the areas of obscenity and political
dissent.
First, in its classification of certain forms of speech as "of such slight social
value as a step to truth"'134 the case at once drew upon Justice Holmes' "market-
place" of ideas,13 5 and, contrary to that concept, laid the foundation for the
evaluation of speech on the basis of the social value of its content, thus prophesy-
ing the obscenity standard which is the law toddy.130
Second, in its development of common law "fighting" words which produce "an
immediate breach of the peace"'1 7 the standard turned the "clear and present
danger" test upon its head by reaching a concept of justified violence against
speech instead of the Holmes concept of unjustified violence advocated by
speech. 138 Further, by the perhaps incidental inclusion of the term "obscene"
within the same sentence as "fighting" words,139 Chaplinsky embodied in a con-
stitutional maxim the connection between obscene speech and responsive violence.
Third, in its announcement of a narrowly limited class of speech "outside the
scope of the First Amendment,"140 the Court in Chaplinsky revealed the explicit
doctrine of non-speech' 41-- speech which need not even be balanced to be
excluded so long as there has been one such weighing-which speech may be ex-
cluded permanently, instead of upon a standard which "depends upon the circum-
stances in which [the speech] is done."'142
Fourth, in regard to speech to be judged by its benefit but "outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality,"' 43 Ckaplinsky signalled the beginning
of the balancing approach to expression, but failed to separate two interests which
should be weighed separately-the interest of the state in morality and the inter-
est of the state in safety. It seemed instead to equate the two, and to imply that
each has not only merit but also goals coequal to the other.
For a generation the Supreme Court has employed, almost without question,
133. See note 24 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
135. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
136. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
137. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
138. See notes 32-34 supra, and Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg, supra note 51, at
177.
139. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
140. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
141. See note 51 supra.
142. See note 33 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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the doctrine of "fighting" words in obscenity law despite the many different and
conflicting positions that Chaplinsky represents. In the arena of political speech,
the concept of the case has been weighed and found wanting many times. It is
time that "fighting" words and all its crystallized assumptions regarding speech
be weighed as well in the balance of erotic speech.
In the free marketplace of ideas, the scales must swing according to the weight
of each factor, and the decision made only when the balance is struck. However,
in regard to erotic speech, it appears that the balance has long sat upon the un-
even ground of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
